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The electronics boom has brought wealth to quite a few Asian countries. Japan1 
of course is the giant in electronics with a dominant global presence. Electronics 
exports account for a major part of Japan's trade surplus. A closer look into Japan's 
success, will indicate that its lead in the high technology2 electronics business is 
founded on a well established semiconductor industry. 
State of the art semiconductor manufacturing techniques enabled Japan to 
continually come up with innovative electronic products. Besides, from a production 
flow point of view, since all modern-day electronics products have semiconductors as 
their key components, the semiconductor industry is sitting on the top of the product-
value-chain. As Japanese semiconductor manufacturers now have a strong position in 
consumer semiconductors, they have the power to control the profit margins of many 
Asian electronics producers just by adjusting the prices of many of their sole-source 
key semiconductor components. 
Modelling themselves after Japan, the so called Four Little Dragons of Asia: 
^ South Korea, Taiwan, and to a lesser extent Singapore and Hong Kong all have tried 
their own ways to gain the same success. Today, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Singapore,3 each have their own special areas of strength, and are all highly successful. 
On the other hand, Hong Kong, due to its unique political and business structures, has 
1 Paula Doe, "Company Survey: Japan Is Tops in Productivity", Electronic Business Asia 
(Hong Kong), VoL2 No.l l November, 1991，Cahners Asia Limited, Hong Kong, 1991, p.62. 
2High technology is original technology and know-how created through fundamental and 
s^plied research and development. The research element of R&D is often elusive and requires a "critical 
mass" of researchers in the field. The high-technology phase is currently in the domain of European, 
U.S., and Japanese companies. "Study on Hong Kong's Electronics Industry” prepared by The Hong 
Kong Productivity Centre for The Industry Department Board，1982, An HKPC publication, 1984， 
^"Study on Hong Kong's Electronics Industry", prepared by The Hong Kong Productivity 
Centre far The Industry Department Board, 1982, An HKPC publication, 1984, pp.147-153. 
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fallen behind the other three Dragons1 in high technology development. If present 
conditions persist, Hong Kong2 will even trail behind the up and coming “Little 
Tigers": Thailand3, Malaysia4, Indonesia5 and southern China's Pearl River Delta 
area6 in the very near future. 
The Mndern-dav Electronics Industry 
and the IC Industry 
Modern day electronics is synonymous with high-technology, or, "hi-tech". At 
the heart of hi-tech are semiconductor integrated circuits, which are sometimes called 
semiconductor chips, semiconductor ICs, semiconductors, or often simply just called 
chips or ICs (see box 1 on page 3: IC - From Sand to Silicon Valley). These tiny chips 
are everywhere. Not only are they in personal computers, they are in telephone sets, 
watches, hi-fi systems, heartbeat pacemakers, automobiles, and, as the Gulf War 
vividly illustrated, advanced weapon systems. In other words, ICs practically control 
our lives. No modern-day human beings can live without them. 
With their revolutionary invention at the American Telephone and Telegraph's 
(AT&T) Bell Laboratories in New Jersey, U.S.A., in the late 1950s, ICs rapidly 
replaced the then widely used vacuum tubes. Compared with the clumsy and unreliable 
vacuum tubes, ICs are tiny, fast, and reliable. Most importantly, ICs are easily mass 
producible and therefore very economical. Applications of ICs have accelerated and 
enabled the waves of miniaturization and automation across the whole spectrum of 
industries. As a result, nowadays, ICs are the key components for all kinds of 
lAnn Marie Angebrandt, "Gloomy Outlook for Hong Kong Exports", Electronic Business 
Asia (Hong Kong), Yol.1 No.7 December, 1990, pp.9-10. 
2Mark Clifford, "Taking on the titans", Far Eastern Economic Review, October 31, 1991, 
Review Publishing Company Limited, Hong Kong, 1991，p.66. 
3Rick Boyd-Merritt, 'Thailand Wants to Move Up a Level in Electronics", Electronic World 
News (Hong Kong), September 23,1991, CMP Publications Inc., New York, 1991, p.l, p.34. 
4William Dennis, "Diversity is Malaysia's Goal", Electronic World News (Hong Kong), July 
22, 1991, p.l, p.21. 
5joel McCoraiick, "Rumors of a Comeback: Once Fiercely Protectionist, Indonesians are 
Trying to Undo Yesterday's Mistakes and Get Electronics Going Again", Electronic Business Asia 
(Hong Kong), Vol.3 No.2, February 1992, pp.36-40. 
^Lewis H. Young, “ A Touch of Chinese Austerity Doesn't Show”, Electronic Business Asia 
(Hong Kong), Vol.1 No.l, May 1990, p.14. 
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industrial and consumer products. We can find their presence everywhere - from the 
everyday two dollar digital watch to the multimillion dollar state of the art military 
equipment 
Box 1: IC - From Sand to Silicon Valley 
It somehow still seemed like magic how scientists, in 1957, at AT&T's Bell 
Laboratories, invented semiconductor transistors - electrical circuits on a 
semiconductor substrate the size of a pin head. The invention of the transistor quickly 
led to the start of the semiconductor industry. Young engineers and scientists with an 
entrepreneurial spirit tried fiercely to commercialize the technology. At the end a very 
successful industry was formed. 
Silicon, a semiconductor, an element which by weight makes up 90% of 
common sand, a material abundant on Earth, forms the bulk of semiconductor chips. 
Different fabrication process technologies yield different chips. There are bipolar 
chips (TTL and ECL), MOS chips (NMOS, PMOS, and CMOS) and BiCMOS chips. 
Recently, there are also developments in the utilization of different semiconductor 
materials other than silicon, the more promising one being gallium-arsenide or GaAs. 
Although there are different end product nomenclatures and starting semiconductor 
materials, the basic fabrication steps are similar (see figure 1 on page 4: 
Manufacturing process for NMOS silicon-gate integrated circuits). 
From the sixties onwards, the semiconductor industry grew at a record 
breaking rate. It constantly out-performed all other industries. Especially during the 
late seventies and early eighties, boosted by the then high flying personal computers 
and information systems businesses, most semiconductor stocks appreciated five to 
ten times. The success of the semiconductor business thrust Silicon Valley, a tiny, 
concentrated area close to San Francisco, where most US semiconductor companies 
are located, into celebrity status. At times it was even more talked about than the 
Hollywood of the movie industry 400 miles to Hie south. 
Currently, the worldwide IC market has grown to more than 50 billion U.S. 
dollars1. Despite the present worldwide recession and a cyclical downturn, the IC 
^"Regional Focus”, Asian Electronics Engineer (Hong Kong), March 1991’ Asiamag Ltd., 
Hong Kong, 1991，p.52. 
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industry is still the fastest growing industry when compared with other major 
industries. Analysts recently have predicted that, in the long-run, worldwide IC sales 
will reach 100 billion U.S. dollars in 1995, and cross the 200 billion mark by the year 
2000.1 Besides their tremendous economic impact, ICs also have a very important 
strategic value, since they are essential components for the most advanced computers 
and weapon systems. Consequently, an advanced IC industry is considered to be the 
fundamental building block for all modern day developed countries. 
Figure 1: Manufacturing process for NMOS silicon-gate integrated circuits. 
(Integrated Circuit Engineering Corporation) 
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The Semiconductor IC Industry in Asia 
Stimulated by the success of the U.S. semiconductor industry, Japan first 
followed suit by a highly coordinated government effort. The result has been 
remarkable. The Japanese first focused on consumer electronics and later, when they 
gained more expertise, they began targeting the market in other areas. What had 
happened in the semiconductor memory market is worth noting. After the industrial 
policy making body MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) made a 
decision to dominate the semiconductor memory market, the Japanese semiconductor 
manufacturers began to collaborate with each other under the guidance of the 
government. They used a systematic, very aggressive, and sometimes questionable 
marketing tactic to capture the majority share of the worldwide market in a short period. 
Their basic strategy? Dumping. The Japanese simply out priced other - most noticeably 
U.S. — competitors. 
However, just pricing alone could not have made Japan the number one 
semiconductor supplier on Earth. The meticulous attention the Japanese give to quality 
assurance is a major contributor to their success. The Japanese semiconductor 
manufacturers have reputation for both their low cost and high quality products. As the 
semiconductor manufacturing process is an operation requiring high degree of accuracy 
and precision, it is a job tailor-made for the highly organized and disciplined Japanese 
work force. Currently, Japan has already close to 50% of the worldwide 50 billion 
U.S. dollar semiconductor IC market.1 
As for the other developing Asian countries, like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore, after a period of high economic growth, they have come to the 
realization that their tradtionally labor-intensive manufacturing industries are incapable 
of sustaining their forward momentum. Influenced by Japan's success in 
semiconductor manufacturing, they all started moving towards more technology-
intensive manufacturing and gradually moved away from labor-intensive 
manufacturing. South Korea, Taiwan and (at a later date) Singapore all set up structures 
very similar to the Japanese model. Governments in these countries take a very active 
role in setting up research and development centers. Local industries can in turn gain 
relatively cheap access to new technologies. The Hong Kong government, on the other 
hand, has a different approach. 
! R U S S Arensman and Ann Marie Angebrandt, 4<Light at the End of the Tunnel?", Electronic 




To positive non-intervention. 
RCL Semiconductors Ltd. and 
the Scope of the Report 
RCL Semiconductors Limited, the company under study, is one of the only 
three local IC companies in Hong Kong. At the moment, RCL is in trouble. Besides 
facing an unfavorable investment environment, there is also an unpredictable owner, an 
agitated management, and an unstable work force. Worst of all, RCL is in a financial 
limbo. While the management is fighting for day to day working capital, the long time 
financial backer is actively terminating the capital subsidy life-line. The phenomenon is 
not limited to RCL. The three (and only three) indigenous IC manufacturers, Hua Ko 
Electronics Incorporated, Vitelic (Hong Kong) Limited, and RCL, are all struggling for 
their existence. Strangely enough, based on trade statistics1, every year, Hong Kong 
has to import millions of dollars worth of semiconductor ICs for its electronics 
industry. Therefore, in theory, Hong Kong does have a natural need for local source of 
IC components. This report attempts to use RCL Semiconductors Ltd. as a case in 
point First, to find out the cause for the present perplexing situation and then, to see if 
there arc possible alternative marketing strategies to warrant RCL continuing with its 
business under this adverse condition. 
^Hong Kong Trade Statistics, June 1991, Census and Statistics Department, 1991. 





This research topic was inspired by Drew Wilson's article in Electronic 
Business Asia1. In the article, the author painted a very gloomy picture for the Hong 
Kong semiconductor industry: 
Faced with muscular competition from Taiwan and Korea in the 
low-end chip market, Hong Kong's Hiree semiconductor manufacturers, 
Vitelic (HK) Ltd., RCL Semiconductors Ltd. and Hua Ko Electronics 
Inc., are at a crossroads - or, one could argue, pinned in place. They 
can't stay in the low-end market, but they're not capable of competing at 
the high-end…2 
The main reason for Hong Kong semiconductor industry's adversity, as argued 
by the industry experts is the lack of government investment Francis Ko, assistant 
general manager for RCL noted in the article that, "without significant government 
investment, there is no chance of competing with Taiwan and Korea." Vitelic (HK)，s 
managing director Raymond Wang, agreed and argued that the semiconductor 
industries in the U.S., Japan and Korea (Taiwan, Singapore, and most ASEAN 
countries could have been added as well) were not started by the private sector alone, 
but initiated by government investment. The article through interviews with other 
industry experts continues to state the need for government involvement in the 
semiconductor IC industry: 
…the three firms can't afford to replace aging chip-making 
equipment, and it is virtually impossible for them to play catch-up with 
government-assisted regional competitors that are "10 biflion dollars and 
iDrew Wilson, "It's Do or Die for a Straggling Chip Industry: Low-end Competition and 
Lack of Capital May Force Semiconductor Makers to Adopt New Strategies." Electronic Business Asia 
(Hong Kong), Vol.2 No.7, July 2’ 1991’ pp.70-71. 
2Ibid. 
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10 years ahead," according to Charles Chapman, executive director of 
the Hong Kong Electronics Association (HKEA). 
Effectively, Hong Kong's tiny IC industry has been left in the 
dust... 
..."(The IC industry) is a capital-intensive, talent intensive 
business and the Hong Kong Government is not aggressively 
promoting such a thing," Vitelic's managing director Raymond Wang 
says.1 
It appears that the Hong Kong government's positive non-intervention policy 
(v.s.) is the culprit for the failure of Hong Kong's IC industry. But what then are the 
future plans for these three IC manufacturers? Interestingly, they all have different 
views of long term survival strategies. While Vitelic (HK), with its Taiwan and U.S. 
ties, aims to specialize into a regional test and verification center, RCL Semiconductors 
is planning for diversification. RCL's assistant general manager Francis Ko thinks, 
moving out of the low-end, selling complete electronic products, and going global is 
the solution for RCL. However, the smallest of Hong Kong's chip-makers, Hua Ko 
Electronics, plans to stick with the low-end track. Hua Ko finds the low-end niche 
market of making chips for watches, toys and clocks a sustainable strategy. Bill Kahl, 
vice president of Asia marketing for National Semiconductor Corp. (a top ten world IC 
semiconductor company2), agrees: 
...(Bill Kahl) says there are still opportunities at the market's 
low-end. "Look at transistors, which you could say are the earliest form 
of semiconductors - they're still used today." 
He says Hong Kong's chip companies might do well to 
concentrate on developing innovative niche products. “ Semiconductors 
and applications are so pervasive that the big companies can't be all 
things to all people," Kahl says. "The big guys focus on areas with 
maximum return while the small guys fill small areas. With a niche, it's 
not too difficult to grow to US$50-$100 million."3 
Based on Hong Kong's trade figures4, Hong Kong's annual semiconductor IC 
trade deficit is close to HK$1 billion. In other words, Hong Kong is highly dependent 
iDrew Wilson, "It,s Do or Die for a Struggling Chip Industry: Low-end Competition and 
Lack of Capital May Force Semiconductor Makers to Adopt New Strategies." Electronic Business Asia 
(Hong Kong), Vol.2 No.7, July 2,1991, pp.70-71. 
2EUzabeth B. Baatz and Linda StaUmann, "Inside the World's Top 50 Chip Companies", 
Electronic Business Asia (Hong Kong), Vol.2 No.7, July 1991，pp.75-76. 
3Drew Wilson, ‘‘It,s Do or Die for a Struggling Chip Industry: Low-end Competition and 
Lack of Capital May Force Semiconductor Makers to Adopt New Strategies." Electronic Business Asia 
(Hong Kong), July 2,1991, pp.70-71. 
4Hong Kong Trade Statistics，June, 1991, Census and Statistics Department, 1991. 
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on imported ICs. However, on the necessity of local IC suppliers, two industry 
experts, Charles Chapman of HKEA and Bill Kahl of National Semiconductor, differ 
in their opinions: 
…Chapman adds that the three firms could take advantage of 
their small size to do shorter, more customized chip runs. “ The 
Japanese can't do that, they're too big," he says. "You don't go to 
Toshiba and ask for 20,000 chips." 
Chapman points out that the territory is dependent on imported 
semiconductors, and that a stronger local chip industry would help to 
regulate semiconductor price fluctuations. Local producers help stabilke 
the market, he explains, by stepping production up or down according 
to demand. . ” 
But National's Kahl thinks the lack of an indigenous 
semiconductor industry isn't necessarily a liability. "A lot of countries 
believe they have to stay ahead in semiconductors to compete in 
electronics," he says. "That's not true. There's a worldwide 
overcapacity. A lot of companies are competing and that drives the price 
margin down. You don't have to strive to be at the leading edge to 
compete."1 
The article provided an overview of Hong Kong IC industry. Obviously, the 
industry is straggling. But one can't help but wonder: if the specific investment 
environment for IC industry has been so unfavorable, why then were the three IC 
companies set up in the first place? 
Another article by Arensman et al2 illustrates the different opinions in 
developing their respective semiconductor industries among the Little Dragons. 
For years, Asia had been looking to the West and Japan for technology, but 
now faced with soaring labor and production costs, and the reluctance of foreign 
competitors to share their latest technology, Asia is turning to develop its own 
independent R&D capabilities. In Taiwan, for example, copying foreign designs wasn't 
just the norm, it seemed the unofficial national policy. It was viewed as the shortcut to 
help Taiwan companies leapfrog into the ranks of major electronics products. The 
phenomenon was not limited to Taiwan. Arensman, Brown and Wilson have the 
following story: 
…Taiwan wasn't alone in relying on foreign technology. Until 
quite recently, few Asian electronics makers outside Japan originated 
iDrew Wilson, "It's Do or Die for a Struggling Chip Industry: Low-end Competition and 
Lack of Capital May Force Semiconductor Makers to Adopt New Strategies." Electronic Business Asia 
(Hong Kong), VoL2 No.7 July 2,1991，pp.70-71. 
2 R U S S Arensman, Geoff Crane, Chris Brown, and Drew Wilson, "Asia Turns On to R&D", 
Electronic Business Asia (Hong Kong), Vol.2 No. 12 December 5,1991, pp.42-52. 
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much of the technology used in the products they manufactured. They 
didn't need to, since the necessary technology could easily be obtained 
through license agreements, government technology transfer programs, 
and in many cases outright thievery of foreign designs. Asian 
companies may not have always offered leading-edge products, but their 
goods usually sold well anyway because they cost a lot less than the 
foreign competition. 
Growth came easily to electronics makers in Asia's newly 
industrializing countries during the 1970s and early 1980s, thanks to 
cheap manufacturing costs and booming worldwide demand. More 
recently, industry development in the region's Little Dragons - Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore - was sustained by carefully planned national 
technology strategies. 
But in the 1990s even the most successful Asian electronics 
makers are being squeezed between soaring labor and production costs, 
and the growing reluctance of foreign competitors to share their latest 
technology. The combination is already causing problems to many 
companies in the region and it threatens to halt the industry's rapid 
growth until more Asian companies learn to develop their own 
technology.1 
What is mentioned in the article can be understood as a logical transformation of 
the high-tech industry. First, the Asian countries jumped into the market with a <4We-
make-cheaper-copies" strategy, but, as the cost differentials diminished, they are now 
in a stage in which they must seek to re-integrate and come up with new strategies for 
the industry. The governments of different Asian countries need to come up with their 
own national technology development plans. Even more public sector coordination is 
needed because of the capital and talent intensive nature of the high-tech industry. 
As a result, Ho and other Asian industry leaders are promoting a 
very different kind of industrial strategy today. "After a certain number 
of years you have to change - you cannot do business as usual," 
concedes Ho. "Me-tooism is no longer a viable business practice."2 
Government initiated R&D activities has become a high priority to catch up in 
technology: 
Research and development has become a much higher priority 
for countries in die region. Mter years of lagging behind the rest of the 
world in R&D spending, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore are all making 
major commitments to public-sector R&D programs, as well as creating 
incentives to encourage more industrial R&D. Examples of that 
increased commitment can be found in: 
* Taiwan, where national R&D spending now equals about 1.3 
percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). The 
iRuss Arensman, Geoff Crane, Chris Brown, and Drew Wilson, "Asia Turns On to R&D", 
Electronic Business Asia (Hong Kong), Vol.2 No.12, December 5,1991, pp.42-52. 
2Ibid. 
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government wants to raise that level to 2 percent of GDP by 1995 and to 
2.5 percent by the year 2000. Officials expect to spend more than US$8 
billion on non-military R&D between now and July 1997 under a six-
year national R&D plan that calls for 30 percent annual spending 
increases. 
* Korea, which already devotes close to 2 percent of its GDP to 
R&D. Its government has announced ambitious plans to increase 
spending to 3.5 percent by 1996 and to 5 percent by the year 2000. 
(Developed countries like Japan, Germany and the U.S. currently spend 
just under 3 percent of their GDP on R&D.) A new eight-year plan, 
dubbed the G-7 Project, should begin next April, aimed at putting 
Korea's technology level on par with the Group of Seven developed 
countries by the year 2000. 
* Singapore, whose national R&D spending reached 1 percent 
of its GDP last year. Officials plan to double spending to 2 percent by 
1995. As part of that effort, the government recently adopted a 
comprehensive national technology plan, and is deciding how to spend 
nearly US$1.2 bilHon to support industry-driven R&D projects during 
the next five years.1 
Noticeably, Hong Kong lacks a commitment to a public-sector technology 
strategy. Hong Kong has fallen from a regional leader status from a decade ago: 
The same commitment to R&D cannot be found in the fourth 
Little Dragon, Hong Kong, which was a regional leader a decade ago. 
While the British colonial government's laissez-faire, pro-business 
stance has been a boom for some industries, its hands-off policy has 
proved disastrous for high-tech electronics manufacturing. Although 
some large electronics firms are still investing in their operations in the 
colony, Hong Kong lacks the kinds of comprehensive public-sector 
technology strategy needed to prevent the industry's continued decline. 
During the past two years the government has taken some 
cautious steps to help the industry, including the opening of a Science 
and Technology University and planning for a new Industry and 
Technology Development Council (ITDC) to promote strategic 
technology areas. But most industry observers view those moves as a 
case of too little, and much too late. A report last year by the U.S.-based 
Stanford Research Institute, for instance, suggested that an ITDC-like 
organization should be funded at about 0.5 percent of GDP, which 
would have required more than six times the U.S.$40 million in annual 
funds now proposed.2 
The whole issue may eventually come down to a matter of survival. Besides the 
Hong Kong government, other officials in the region have expressed a sense of 
urgency about the need to move quickly to shore up their industries' competitive 
positions. 
iRuss Arensman, Geoff Crane, Chris Brown, and Drew Wilson, "Asia Turns On to R&D”， 
Electronic Business Asia (Hong Kong), Vol.2 No.12, December 5,1991, pp.42-52. 
2Ibid. 
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..."We feel that we have to catch up (in R&D)," says Chou Siaw 
Kiang, executive director of Singapore's National Science and 
Technology Board. "If we don't move fast enough we will see 
ourselves filing even further behind." 
Chintay Shih, executive vice president of Taiwan's Industrial 
Technology Research Institute (ITRI), says his country's electronics 
industry has no choice but to increase its R&D efforts. <cWe've reached 
a new stage in development," says Shih. "We have to increase 
manufacturing, design and R&D capabilities, because everything we do 
from now on is a matter of survival." 
Similar sentiments are echoed in Korea by Sung Ki-soo, 
president of the government-funded Systems Engineering Research 
Institute (SERI), an affiliate of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science 
and Technology (KAIST). "Research and development should receive 
the same priority and funding as national defense," says Sung...1 
Report 
Another very significant reference is a report by the Hong Kong Productivity 
Council (HKPC) in 1982. The report is the summary of the work carried out in a study 
commissioned to the HKPC by the Industrial Development Board. The 
recommendations were to be used by the Hong Kong government to strengthen the 
electronics industry in Hong Kong. The essence of the report can be found in its 
foreword: 
...The existing Hong Kong electronics industry has grown and 
prospered 迅rough a pattern that has evolved over the years. With few 
exceptions, the industry has been based on offering competitively priced 
private label goods typically assembled from imported components. The 
main attribute of the Hong Kong electronics industry is its ability to 
deliver styling and product changes in time to meet buyer demands in 
the fad segment of consumer electronic products. 
Trends of the electronics industry show a long term reduction in 
organization size and more recently both a steady decline in the value 
added content of its products, and a decrease in the number of technical 
graduates joining the industry. These trends are undesirable for the 
development of the electronics industry, and they are due to the high 
concentration of similar production assembly operations resulting in an 
over competitive supply; and to the lack of investment in the other 
higher value added and knowledge-intense activities such as marketing, 
technology development, product and process development, and after 
sales service. By purely developing as a fast reaction production source 
for low and medium technology electronic products, the industry now 
has characteristics of size and structure which make it difficult to reverse 
trends and to move in the direction of improving the overall value added 
content However, based on market and supply considerations, only the 
! R U S S Arensman, Geoff Crane, Chris Brown, and Drew Wilson, "Asia Turns On to R&D", 
Electronic Business Asia (Hong Kong), Vol.2 No.12, December 5,1991，pp.42-52. 
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electronics industry can offer Hong Kong any substantial prospect for 
export growth of manufactured goods. 
As no worker can for long be paid more than the value he adds 
to a product without his employer going out of business, value added 
especially on export activities is the key to raising the standard of living 
in Hong Kong. In the opinion of HKPC, a new industrial development 
towards the design, production and marketing of 'technology-intense' 
products represents a real opportunity and probably now the only 
feasible direction for increasing the industiy's value added. The term 
‘technology-intense, denotes the application of available high 
technology in product and is essentially a marketing and development 
intensive management activity, whereas the creation of high technology 
is a research and development intensive activity. The value added in a 
'technology-intense' business is derived from an entrepreneur's ability 
to identify opportunities for highly differentiated ‘niche，products that 
fill special needs, and his ability to identify and to integrate the 
necessary skills and resources to foster and fully exploit an idea in a 
timely way. . 
The past history and present pattern of the local electronics 
industry do not suggest that a technology-intense electronics industry 
will spontaneously develop in Hong Kong. Presently, there are major 
structural faults that prevent crossover to the technology-intense phase. 
The Government of Hong Kong must help to create an environment 
conducive to the fomiation of new technology-intense enteiprises so that 
Hong Kong can exploit what are virtually unlimited market 
opportunities. Electronics is a vast international business with products 
of unlimited variations; thus tiie effort of Hong Kong to diversify will 
not likely be limited by demand constraints but rather by supply factors. 
There are four essential ingredients to the success of every 
technology-intense enterprise. First, people. Second, markets: the 
existence of markets and their distribution channels, and the capability to 
identify and exploit these markets. Third, sources of supply of needed 
parts and components. Fourth, capital: a source of funds sufficient to 
finance the development, manufacturing and marketing of technology-
intense products. 
To tackle the major weaknesses existing at present in the four 
essential ingredients for industrial success, we recommend in this report 
the establishment of an Electronics Technology Development 
Laboratory, a Precision Metalworking Institute, a Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing Institute, the provision of venture capital, and 
appropriate programmes to improve Hong Kong's marketing capability. 
This report is not intended to belittle the considerable 
achievements of the electronics industry, but rather, it is aimed at 
making improvements in areas of weaknesses identified. To add a new 
growth dimension, we believe that Government involvement on a 
broader front will be needed. Our individual recommendations come 
together in an overall strategy. If recommendations are pursued partially 
or in fragmented manner, the prospects for developing a technology-
intense electronics industry will be remote. 
The output from this study represents the distillation of the 
results of a substantial programme of work. The conclusions and 
recommendation are based upon an intensive study of the electronics 
industry by HKPC and its subcontractor, Arthur D. Little International 
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Inc. It is hoped that this report will form a sound basis for the Industrial 
Development Board to formulate an industry support programme.1 
The message is quite clear. Hong Kong's electronics industry had been very 
successful. However, the industry's present mode of providing fast reaction on 
production of low and medium technology products has come close to its end. As 
'Value-addedness" deteriorates, the only viable way to revive the industry is through 
‘^ technology-intense，’ products. This is something imperative to Hong Kong's export-
oriented business structure, as, based on market and supply considerations, the 
electronics industry is the only prospect of growth. The transformation of the 
electronics industry won't be spontaneous. Since there are structural faults in the 
industry, as it is noted in the passage, 4<the Hong Kong government must help to create 
an environment conducive to the formation of new technology-intense enterprises…” 
Due to the sheer size of the international electronics market, the limiting factor - as 
noted - is likely to be supply rather than demand. 
After the report was published in 1983, the Hong Kong government did 
considerably change its hands-off attitude. Though no organizations like the 
aforementioned ETDL，PMI and CIMI (Electronics Technology Development 
Laboratory, Precision Metalworking Institute, and Computer Integrated Manufacturing 
Institute) were set up, the government did try to upgrade the necessary infrastructure 
for high technology development An ASIC design center2 was set up within the VTC 
(Vocational Training Council) for the training of existing engineers. In addition, a 
controversial new University of Science and Technology of Hong Kong has been 
established, catering to the education of technical graduates and performing the badly 
needed central R&D work. However, the pace has been very slow. Many industry 
experts have expressed their disappointment.3 
As to the evolution of Hong Kong's electronics industry, the report gave a 
concise and informative summary: 
The electronics industry of Hong Kong started in 1959 
following a decision by Japan to freely export electronic components for 
radio receivers. This led to the establishment of small local factories 
lwStudy on Hong Kong Electronics Industry", Hong Kong Productivity Council, April 20’ 
1983. 
2Robin Agarwal, "A Case of Too Little, Too Late: Government Breaks Hands-off Policy to 
Fund ASIC Design Center," Electronic Business Asia (Hong Kong), Vol.1 No.l, May 5,1990, p.21. 
3Tom McHale, "Hong Kong Faces the Future", Electronic Business Asia (Hong Kong), Vol.2 
No.l, Jan. 1991, p.5. 
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which operated by assembling transistor radios using components from 
Japan. At that time, only a few factories were operating and the output 
of these factories constituted an insignificant part of the economy. The 
radio receiver industry is the oldest sector of Hong Kong's electronic 
industry.1 
(However, the dependency of Hong Kong's electronics industry on Japanese 
components has remained until now.) 
I The radio receiver industry expanded rapidly in the 1970s to 
include other audio equipment items such as cassette tape recorders, and 
the two items alone accounted for almost all of Hong Kong's output in 
mature consumer products. In 1981，about 30% of Hong Kong's 
electronic exports were in mature electronics products and this 
constitutes the first stream of Hong Kong's electronics industry. 
Foreign investments in Hong Kong represent the second stream 
of the electronics industry. In the early sixties, a few leading American 
electronics companies, such as Fairchild Semiconductor, Ampex 
Ferrotec Ltd., and Teledyne Semiconductor, set up manufacturing 
facilities in Hong Kong to assemble discrete components, e.g. core 
memory component packages, diodes, transistors and capacitors. At that 
time, Hong Kong's main attraction to foreign electronic investors was 
the abundance of low-cost labour, a low tax rate, and a free enterprise 
system. Furthermore, there were then very few countries in the region 
who could offer equal attractions to foreign companies. 
Foreign investment in the form of subsidiary companies 
provided an effective means of technological transfer. Factories under 
foreign management served as a training ground for engineers, middle 
management and technicians, and many of them later took up various 
executive and managerial positions in the industry. During the late 60，s 
and 70，s, foreign investment dominated the Hong Kong electronics 
industry, both in terms of employment and output 
The 70's saw a gradual phasing out of core memory systems 
and a move into packaging and testing of semiconductor memories and 
other integrated circuits by these foreign subsidiary companies. 
However, the packaging and testing of semiconductor components 
peaked in 1980 and was overtaken by the assembly of computer parts, 
an activity also dominated by foreign subsidiary companies. 
The 70，s also saw the dominance of foreign subsidiaries give 
way to the rapid expansion of local participation of electronics 
manufacturing. The balance was tipped not only by the growth in the 
radio receiver industry, but also by the emergence of a third stream of 
the electronics industry. 
This third stream of the electronics industry is the fad product 
stream, and it was fostered by the advent of microelectronics, particular 
in microprocessors, which created many self-contained and very 
marketable fad product opportunities. These new business opportunities 
prompted many small local manufacturers to put parts and components 
together quickly to farm fad products in response to changing market � ： 
needs. The first boom was created by the mass production of electronic 
calculators. With the wide application of LEDs and LCDs, the 
lwStudy on Hong Kong Electronics Industry", Hong Kong Productivity Council，April 20, 
1983, p.8. 
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manufacturing of electronic watches and clocks added momentum to the 
growth of the industry. 
Different kinds of electronic and TV games were then 
manufactured, and, recently, local companies have been exporting 
personal computers and peripheral units. Telephones were one of the 
successful examples of fad products.1 
(Hong Kong has, since 1982，exported tens of millions units of telephone sets. 
Electronic organizers and dictionaries are the latest fad products where Hong Kong has 
a dominant global market share.) 
Clearly, Hong Kong's electronics industry has long developed a dependency on 
foreign, especially Japanese，technology. With limited help from the government, 
Hong Kong's electronics industry, though, has marginally moved onto more 
technology intensive manufacturing, but still remained largely reactive to the market. It 
seems logical that the only way for the Hong Kong electronics industry to have more 
independence is to have local semiconductor suppliers. However, the report basically 
thinks Hong Kong cannot afford to have one: 
y Technology-intensive activity is the least difficult and probably 
the only feasible direction of development for Hong Kong... In process 
fabrication of standard parts and components (ICs), the return on 
investment is slow. The volume production of standard parts and 
components is a highly competitive international business, requiring 
substantial capital and research and development effort. Hong Kong — 
does not possess any comparative advantage for this line of business. 
...(Substantial investment in R&D) is required to create the high 
technology. This can only be undertaken in very large and advanced 
economies. At present, it appears that only the United States and Japan 
are really successful.2 
Things have changed a lot since 1983. The United States and Japan are not the 
only countries that can sustain high technology investments. The Europeans now have 
a leading edge semiconductor IC industry. Regionally, Taiwan and South Korea have 
both been quite successful in their respective semiconductor businesses. My opinion is 
that, based on the coverage and weight this report gave to the semiconductor IC 
portion, the consultant who prepared the report was not very knowledgeable about the 
industry. 
lKStudy on Hong Kong Electronics Industry", Hong Kong Productivity Council, April 20, 
1983, pp.8-9. 
2"Study on Hong Kong Electronics Industry", Hong Kong Productivity Council，April 20, 
1983, pp.Ell-12. 
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Thesis 
In their 1982 thesis, Tang and Chow basically followed the same critical view 
of the Hong Kong government They stated that the Hong Kong government was not 
doing enough, even though it had provided assistance in terms of low cost land leases 
at the Taipo Industrial Estate: 
(IC)1 is the basic ingredient of sophisticated electronic products, 
without which advancement cannot be made. Japanese semiconductor 
manufacturers, through government aid, have pioneered (IC) fabrication 
in (the) Far East and supported their own OEMs (Original Equipment 
Manufacturers) and have also captured a major portion of the worldwide 
electronic components market with high success and (have) position(ed) 
themselves as the major competitors to the U.S., Countries like South 
Korea and Taiwan also realize the importance of (ICs) and are 
developing their own technology. In Taiwan, the Industrial Research 
Institute (ITRI) operated by the government has a joint venture agreement 
with RCA at a cost exceeding US$100 million. Korea Semiconductor 
Incorporated together with the government has licensing and joint 
venture agreements with US-based semiconductor firms in the transfer of 
technology 
It is reported that one of the three (IC) manufacturers at the 
Taipo Industrial Estate (will be) in full operation at (the) end of 1981. 
These three projects are joint ventures between local industrialists and 
American semiconductor companies. Product emphasis will be on watch 
CMOS (Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor), microprocessors, 
and memory integrated circuits.The Hong Kong government is not 
actively involved in these ventures except offering lower cost land at 
Taipo Industrial Estate to encourage pioneer industries in the colony. 
Hong Kong must realize that to diversify its electronics industry 
is a major undertaking and it can be achieved only through close 
cooperation and participation between the private sector and 
government. However, it must be emphasized that the lead and impetus 
have to come from the government, as no individual organization would 
have the necessary resources to carry out this job as effectively as the 
government.2 
Tang and Chow also advocated tiie idea of having an indigenous IC technology: 
...the importance of having (IC) technology firmly rooted in 
Hong Kong should be emphasized. Presently, local electronic 
manufacturers depend on imported (ICs) and some imported electronic 
components. We earn our added value by putting in assembly labor. 
However, our cost advantage in labor is gradually being surpassed by 
iThe thesis used the term LSIs (Large Scale Integrated Circuits) instead of the more 
卿ropriatp term ICs. 
2Man-lung Tang and Wai-yiu Chow, "A study of (the) Potential Electronics Development in 
(the) People's Republic of China in (the) Perspective of Hong Kong(’s) Electronic Industry", CUMBA 
Project Report, 1982, Library of The Chinese University of Hong Kong, pp.22-25. 
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the low labor cost countries and unless Hong Kong has the ability to 
produce our own (ICs), we cannot have the edge over our competitors. 
Furthermorc, having local (IC) manufacturing capability, Hong 
Kong will be less (affected) by the fluctuations of overseas supplies 
during shortage period. 
Microprocessors, CMOS circuits, and memones are the hot 
items in the IC lines. Hence it is most advantageous for local 
manufacturers to develop this technology which is a highly capital- and 
technical-intensive venture, but the long term return on investment wUl 
be most rewarding and meaningful to the diversification of our 
electronics industry...1 
Tang and Chow were right about the long term deterioration of Hong Kong's 
ability to add value to its electronic products. They failed to suggest a feasible solution 
for the enhancement of Hong Kong's IC industry. It sounds almost as if they were 
pleading for someone to perform "self-sacrifice" and venture into IC manufacturing. 
Maybe they had the insight that the Hong Kong government would never alter much 
from its positive non-intervention business policy. But then, who would be altruistic 
enough in this very capitalistic colony to actually take up the difficult task of investing 
in a low ROI (return on investment) IC manufacturing business? 
^an-lung Tang and Wai-yiu Chow, "A study of (the) Potential Electronics Development in 
(the) People's Republic of China in (the) Perspective of Hong Kong('s) Electronic Industry", CUMBA 
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This research is largely exploratory and to some extent descriptive. The purpose 
of this research is to find out the appropriate background information and the possible 
alternative marketing strategies for RCL Semiconductors. Both primary research and 
secondary research were conducted. Specifically the author hoped to gain insight to the 
following: 
(1) Why the company was founded 
(2) RCL's performance as compared to other companies in the industry 
(3) RCL's strengths and weaknesses as a company 
(4) RCL's products 
(5) RCL's products' strengths and weaknesses compared to other companies 
(6) RCL's customers and potential customers for different products 
(7) RCL's customers' attitudes regarding different products 
(8) RCL's customers' consumption patterns for different products 
(9) How RCL's customers make purchasing decisions for different products 
(10) RCL's primary market 
(11) RCL's market environment 
(12) RCL's market size 
(13) RCL's market share in its market 
(14) RCL's growth potential 
(15) RCL's competitive environment 
(16) RCL's competitors' strengths and weaknesses 
(17) Possible Strategies for RCL 
Primary Research 
Data collection method 
Data were collected by personal interviews via semi-structured questionnaires 
(Appendices I, n, III). A total of twelve interviews ~ six among seniors managers in 
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RCL, and six among customers and industry experts - were conducted. For the 
industry experts category, in addition to a neutral third party expert, a senior manager 
from each of RCL's local competitors, Hua Ko Electronics Inc. and Vitelic (HK) Ltd 
were interviewed. The confidentiality of the responses was guaranteed. This method 
was considered proper as many of the questions are rather sensitive and response 
flexibility is required. The questionnaire was first pretested by personal interviews with 
two industrial experts each time until no major revision of the questionnaire was 
required. 
Sampling 
Only people with specific knowledge of the field were interviewed. The survey 
was targeted at: 
(1) RCL's middle and senior management 
(2) RCL's customers 
(3) Senior management of the other IC company - Hua Ko Electronics Inc. 
(4) Senior management of the remaining IC company - Vitelic (HK) Ltd. 
(5) Other industry experts 
For sample groups (3) and (4), since they are RCL's close local competitors, 
the questions regarding competitive profile were not asked. 
Secondary Research 
Data collection method 
Data collection was facilitated by an extensive literature search. Industrial 
reports, theses, professional magazines and newspapers were all considered as relevant 
sources. Additionally, statistical data were obtained from the Hong Kong Census and 
Statistics Department (see also Chapter D). 
Analysis 
In the analysis, a marketing systems approach was used. First, profile analyses 
were conducted for both RCL's internal and external environment. The internal 
environment variables include RCL's company, and its products and services. The 
external environment variables include RCL's customers, competitors, and market. In 
terms of the internal environment variables analyses, attention is paid to the inherent 
strengths and weaknesses of RCL's company, and its products and services. As for the 
external environment variables, the analytic criterion varies. For RCL's customers, the 
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attention is on who the customers and potential customers are, their attitudes towards 
RCL, their expectations concerning RCL's products and services, and their decision 
making process. For RCL's competition, the attention is on RCL's competitors' 
strengths and weaknesses and their possible strategies. Finally, for RCL's market, the 





RCL the Company 
Background of RCL 
The colonial government of Hong Kong, unlike other governments in the 
region, was (and has remained) never keen on government intervention in business. 
They had long established a positive non-intervention approach (v.s.) in Hong Kong. It 
has often been cited as the major reason for the prosperity in the colony (or the 
territory1). Hence, the Hong Kong government carried this same attitude towards the 
electronics industry, even though there were highly coordinated efforts from 
governments around the region to help building up their respective high-tech industries. 
Nevertheless, the Hong Kong government did give a token contribution to Hong 
Kong's high-tech development. In 1979, Taipo Industrial Estate in the New Territories 
was established to encourage the local business community to set up semiconductor 
ventures.2 The main attraction was the cheap lease of land for the plants. RCL 
Semiconductor Ltd., El Cap Semiconductor Ltd. and Hua Ko Electronics Inc. were the 
only three companies brave enough to take up the challenge. 
Founding of RCL 
RCL Semiconductors Limited, named after its founder, the late Mr. Richard C. 
Lee, CBE, JP” was founded in 1979. In his 1981 speech at the inauguration of the 
new plant, Mr. Lee, RCL's Chairman, touted the opening of the factory and declared 
that the coming of the microelectronics industry symbolized Hong Kong's entry into a 
new era of high technology manufacturing. He said that, looking back, Hong Kong 
1 After the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, officials of both Hong Kong 
and China favor the tenn, "the territory" over the "derogatory" term, "the colony". 
2Man-lung Tang, and Wai-yiu Chow, "A Study of (The) Potential Electronics Development 
in (The) People's Republic of China in (The) Perspective of Hong Kong(’s) Electronics Industry", 
CUMBA Project Report, 1982, Library of The Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
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had gained a lot in the seventies as the financial and investment center of the Far East. 
However, Hong Kong's overall industrial growth had lagged behind its neighboring 
countries. In his mind, RCL semiconductors Limited would be regarded as a model for 
high technological development in the industrial sector in Hong Kong. 
His vision was well justified. Hong Kong throughout the seventies had 
gradually shifted from labor-intensive manufacturing towards higher value-added, 
technology-intensive manufacturing. In the beginning, there were transistor radios and 
at the turn of the eighties, the electronics industries had blossomed into producers of a 
great variety of consumer electronics. Despite the apparent transformation, the industry 
basically remained in the stage of low value added assembly works. Dependence on 
imported supply of basic components, especially ICs, was believed to be the key factor 
limiting the industry's ability to compete internationally. 
Thus, the paramount goal behind the founding of RCL, as Mr. Lee put it, was 
to serve the electronics industry of Hong Kong. The company's aspiration was to 
provide local manufacturers with up-to-date circuits that would suit the ever-changing 
requirements of their end products. Besides, a local semiconductor supplier would 
allow manufacturers access to needed components at lower cost 
Mr. Lee, therefore, seemed very dedicated to spearheading high-technology 
development in Hong Kong. 
However, from a purely business point of view, it seems he did not realize the 
nature of the semiconductor business. 
The semiconductor business is very capital-intensive and talent-intensive,1 and 
RCL did not have either. 
Most of the HK$20 million initial investment was used for land and buildings. 
RCL had to borrow immediately to fulfill its equipment purchases. A cash flow 
problem was persistent. RCL had from the start operated in the red. With hindsight, 
RCL was under-invested right from the beginning. On the human resources side, RCL 
had to depend on expatriate technical know-how. Overseas consultants were given 
short term contracts to work for RCL. Local fresh graduates were hired and trained 
internally. Emphasis was placed on the processing techniques. Not much stress was 
placed on designs, as it was decided that designs could be copied. 
^Drew Wilson, "It's Do or Die for a Struggling Chip Industry", Electronic Business Asia 
(Hong Kong), Vol.2 No.7, July 1991, p.70. 
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The Chinese Connection 
It might have seemed very odd that Mr. Lee, reputedly one of the keenest 
businessmen in Hong Kong would have taken up such a risky business in his sixties. 
Only later did it gradually become known that Mr. Lee had a powerful backer, 
the government of the People's Republic of China. 
China at the time had long wanted to augment its knowledge of semiconductor 
technology. However, during the seventies and the turn of the eighties, the Western 
world strictly forbade the licensing of semiconductor technology to the communist 
countries. They feared the communist countries would used the technology in their 
weapon systems and could in turn undermine the security of the free world. Western 
industrial countries set up COCOM (see box COCOM), to regulate the trading of high-
technology. 
Box2:CQCQMl 
COCOM, a French acronym for the Paris-based Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls, was set up in 1949 by the West to make sure strategic 
technology wasn't shipped to communist bloc countries. If countries are "in" 
COCOM, they don't have to get clearances to import sophisticated kit. Otherwise, 
they have to get clearances to import high-end technology, a complicated, time-
consuming and sometimes forbidding procedure. 
In a desperate move, China turned to its neighbor down south. Hong Kong, 
being a British colony, was not listed as a "hostile country" to the West. Technology 
entering Hong Kong, although regulated by COCOM, was rarely refused. Mr. Lee, 
being a keen businessman, agreed to let the Chinese use RCL as a conduit to gain 
access to Western semiconductor process technology in exchange for goodwill and 
financial support Of course, the whole thing was covert in nature without the 
knowledge of any western countries and even the Hong Kong government. 
Ijoel McConnick, "One Country, Two Systems: Colony to Retain Cocom Approval", 
Electronic Business Asia (Hong Kong), Vol.3 No.2, February 1992, p.80. 
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RCL's Current Status 
Because of the Chinese backup, profitability was never a priority for RCL. The 
situation continued until late 1989. After the June 4th massacre in 1989, Chinese 
Premier Li Peng carefully studied all Chinese and Chinese-sponsored industries, 
including joint ventures. Historical losses had pressed China to re-evaluate their 
investments. By this time, the Chinese had invested a lot in RCL, and had become its 
majority shareholder. Cumulative losses at RCL had mounted to close to HK$200 
million1 and rising. Faced with criticism and pressure from the central government, 
MMEI (the Ministry of Machinery and Electronics Industries, the organization which 
now was responsible for the running of RCL) turned the heat on RCL's management 
From another angle, circumstances had also rendered the role of RCL as a 
laboratory for the Chinese no longer important. Throughout the eighties, although there 
were some tense moments between the Sino-U.S. relationship, China's consistent 
attitude in its open-door policy won more trust from the West. As a result, COCOM 
had gradually relaxed its control on semiconductor technology exports to China. By 
1989, there were already several semiconductor lines running in China. 
China has a heavy reliance on foreign IC imports. Rumor has it that although 
China is a top notch oil exporter, its annual oil revenue does not even compensate for 
its annual IC imports. The outcome of the Gulf War also delivered a blow to the 
Chinese government The Chinese long-held pride in its largest conventional army 
reserve -- the PLA (Peoples' Liberation Army) -- was shaken: it suddenly realized how 
vulnerable a conventional military setup is in "hi-tech warfare". Because of the great 
trade imbalance and national security reasons, China is striving to gain its technology 
independence in semiconductor ICs. As a result, to invest in semiconductor technology 
is the major objective for the 8th 5-year plan which started in 1991. 
With all the actions within China, RCL can expect even less attention in the near 
term. Pressed by the adverse situation, RCL's management is frantically scrambling 
around for new strategies. First, all these years of R&D and cost center attitude have 
structurally molded RCL into a product driven rather than market driven organization. 
Second, RCL's perennial under-investment have left RCL technologically five to ten 
years behind those of its competitors in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. 
iRCL Semiconductors Ltd. Directors, Report and Financial Statements, 30th June 1990. 
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RCL's Products 
In the beginning, the main line of production at RCL was wafer fabrication of 
integrated circuits. The primary end product was MOS chips. They had a four inch 
wafer line which was, in 1981, as good as the technology in the West. As the target 
market was Hong Kong, consumer electronics like watch chips, voice and melody 
chips, calculator chips, and some full custom chips were the main products. At the 
same time, there were always visitors from China "visiting" RCL. The Chinese was 
using RCL to fabricate their experimental chips. RCL also set up a supplementary LCD 
(liquid crystal display) line. LCDs were hot items from watch and calculator displays 
up to large area displays for game and instrument applications. 
In 1988, attempting to upgrade its process technology, RCL finally invested in 
a morc advanced second hand five inch single poly-silicon single metal wafer line. With 
this process line, RCL does have a small technical edge among the three local 
semiconductor IC houses because the other two semiconductor houses, Hua Ko and 
Vitelic (HK), are still using the outdated four inch process lines. Last year (1991)， 
RCL's management took decisive measures and sold the losing LCD and ineffective 
four-inch wafer line to local government organizations in the Guangdong province. 
Current RCL is left with four major product lines and their information can best 
be summarized in table 1 on the next page. 
As can be seen, RCL's present product portfolio contains only low-end 
consumer products. Despite the stable sales, RCL's profitability is plagued by the lack 
of capacity. According to the management, there is a bottleneck in the manufacturing 
process that is limiting the overall throughput. The upgrade could cost as much as one 
million U.S. dollars, and MMEI is unwilling to throw in the money before a positive 
tend is obvious. RCL's management is facing a "Chicken and Egg" dilemma. 
RCL' s Customer Profile 
Major customers of RCL are locally based. According to the survey, RCL's 
customers view RCL's products as commodities. Also, RCL's customers are mostly 
fad and fast reaction product producers geared for the export market. These customers 
themselves are competing in price with their respective end-products. Therefore, 
naturally, they look at RCL's products with a cost conscious attitude. Unit price is 
always a priority if not the foremost priority. Information on RCL's customers is 
summarized in table 2 on the next page. 
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Product Line Applications Sales Relative Margin 
Melody ICs Greeting Cards, toys, Stable High 
door bells, telephone 
buzzers etc. 
Timepiece ICs Digital clocks and watches Low for digital 
Digital displays 御 1 ? 8 
A , ^； t High for analog Analog displays displays 
(only local supplier) v , 
Voice ICs Toys stable ffigh 
Calculator ICs Electronic calculators Stable Medium 
Table 1: RCL's products and their applications 
Product Line Number of Consumption Price sensitivity 
customers patterns 
Melody ICs Many-local Peak between High 
March to October 
Small quantities 
Timepiece ICs Two - local Even throughout High for digital 
the year displays 
Low for analog 
displays 
Voice ICs Many - local Peak between 
March to October Medium 
Small quantities 
Calculator ICs One - local Even throughout Medium 
the year 
Table 2: RCL's products and their customers 
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Most customers expressed the importance of quality and lead-time. Quite a 
number of them are disappointed with the service and quality of RCL's products, 
though most of them indicated that they would order from RCL for shorter delivery 
time. 
Another reason for customers to continue buying RCL's products, as the 
customer survey indicates，is that they perceive RCL's products to have unique and 
advanced features which RCL's competitors' lack. Information on RCL's customers' 
perception of its products is summarized in table 3: 
Product Line Customers' Perception 
Melody ICs Longer melody time 
Timepiece ICs Only local supplier of "analog-display" chips 
Voice ICs Comprehensive library of different "voices" 
Calculator ICs No uniqueness 
Table 3: RCL's products and their uniqueness 
In another light, the low number of customers and small customer base is due 
largely to the lack of active marketing from RCL. RCL's management has already 
committed itself to improvement in this area. As a matter of fact, the present 
organization re-structuring is targeted at turning RCL into a more market-oriented 
company. 
RCL's Market Profile 
Market Conditions for the Semiconductor 
IC Industry in General 
Affected by the present worldwide recession and with no new innovative 
production on the horizon, the semiconductor IC industry in general is facing slow 
growth. However, in the longer term, some of the present investments in product 
designs like HDTV, high performance workstations, and the expansion of 
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telecommunication markets in underdeveloped countries as well as the newly opened 
Eastern European countries could produce good growth for the industry.1 
Market Conditions for the Semiconductor 
IC Industry in Hong Kong 
Since RCL's primary market is Hong Kong, it is very important to focus on 
some of the local market issues. Traditionally, Hong Kong's electronics exports are 
heavily dependent on the U.S. market. As there is a prolonged recession in the U.S., 
the present outlook for the overall electronics manufacturing sector is gloomy. 
Surprisingly though, the slump has not affected the low-end business much. As a 
result, RCL's business activities have even shown slight increase in demand. One 
explanation might be the increase in demand for cheaper toys and gift items during 
recession times. 
At the moment, although all three low-end IC suppliers are running at capacity, 
Hong Kong is still highly dependent on outside semiconductor IC supplies. The 
situation could get worst in the longer term because, there are signs that the Japanese 
have gained even more control over key semiconductor components. Moreover, the 
need for those components will increase as Hong Kong's electronics exports are 
expected to increase following the U.S. economic recovery. Basic on various indicators 
and the experts' views, it will happen as soon as the second half of 1992 and not later 
than 1993. 
The Hong Kong government has acknowledged the need for centralized efforts 
to coordinate and improve ttie high-tech environment in Hong Kong. However,the 
implementation, has been limited by the lack of expertise and very often financial 
constraints. With the major new airport project coming up, it has become even more 
unlikely that the government could afford to vigorously help the ailing semiconductor 
industry. 
People with longer term perspectives have started looking at the possibilities of 
a joint semiconductor effort between China and Hong Kong. Some even mentioned the 
inclusion of Taiwan. The basic formula is for Hong Kong to contribute in the finance 
and marketing aspects, China or Taiwan in technology (of course Taiwan is J^ ie ideal 
choice), and China for cheap engineering human resources. There is no question that as 
1 "Finally, a Bit of Good News in 1991: Midyear Update", Electronic World News (Hong 
Kong), July 8,1991, p.l, p.33. 
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1997 approaches, there will be some kind of transformation and re-integration of the 
local semiconductor industry. General feeling for the greater cooperation between 
China and Hong Kong in high technology development is positive. 
Market Size and Share 
Market size and share of RCL's products cannot be determined due to the lack 
of both external and internal statistics. However, from all indications, the market is 
very large for RCL. With ever increasing in demand, the long term outlook for low-end 
semiconductor ICs is good. Industrial experts generally believe the market will be 
supply side limited for the near term. 
RCL's Competition 
RCL's Immediate Competitors 
RCL's immediate competition comes from the regional (Japan, Taiwan and 
Korea) and the two local (Hua Ko and Vitelic) semiconductor manufacturers. 
Mormation regarding RCL's competitive profile is summarized in table 4 on the next 
page. 
In order to understand RCL's immediate competitors, summary notes were 
gathered on them. Special attention is paid to the near future movements in their 
respective semiconductor sectors. 
Japan 
Japan still has the leading edge technology. The semiconductor industry in 
Japan is basically integrated vertically into big conglomerates. Japanese semiconductor 
IC companies have been the most successful in the consumer electronics market 
segment. While consumer electronics have provided most of the international trade 
surplus for Japan in the last decade, the current global recession has finally delivered a 
blow to the Japanese electronics industry,1 and in turn its semiconductor IC industry. 
1 Jacob M. Schlesinger, "Japan's Electronics Giants Under Pressure", Asian Wall Street 
Journal, February 24,1992, Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 1992, p.l, p.20. 
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Product Line Competitors Competitors' Competitors' 
strengths weaknesses 
Melody ICs HuaKo Low cost and Low quality 
low price 
Higher price 
Taiwan Good quality Long lead time 
No credit tenns 
Timepiece ICs Japan High quality High price 
Long lead time 
Good reputation No credit terms 
Do not sell in small 
quantities 
Voice ICs Taiwan Good quality Higher price 
Long lead time 
No credit terms 
Calculator ICs Korea Can fulfill Higher price 
volume orders Long lead time 
Taiwan No credit terms 
Table 4: RCL's products and their competitors 
Recent reports have indicated that a lot of the high profit earning electronic 
giants in Japan have suffered more than 50% drops in profit. Some of them are even 
reporting their first ever losses in history.1 The outlook for these Japanese 
semiconductor IC companies is not good for 1992. They will just have to wait out the 
recession before they see any significant new growtii. 
As for their semiconductor IC strategies, the Japanese have long strived to take 
the technology leadership role. Their ambition is to have a tight control in high-end 
electronics components including semiconductor ICs. They realize that Japan cannot 
compete with the Asian developing countries in terms of labor-intensive manufacturing. 
Their goal is to have a stranglehold on their essential components and skim as much 
profit as possible in doing so. As they invest more money on high-end R&D and 
1 Jacob M. Schlesinger, "Japan's Electronics Giants Under Pressure", Asian Wall Street 
Journal, February 24,1992, p.l, p.20. 
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expensive semiconductor equipment, chances are that they cannot afford to waste their 
precious capacity on low-end products like the watch and melody chips and will just 
source them from the cheaper producers form the neighboring countries. 
Korea 
Korea's semiconductor IC industry is structured exactly like the Japanese. With 
well coordinated efforts from the government, the industry has seen exports average 
over fifty percent growth annually from 1986 to 1988.1 However, because of huge 
wage increases at home coupled by the eroding price-competitiveness overseas, the 
growth of the industry had slowed to only around five percent in 1989. In 1991，the 
growth even became negative. The need for fundamental change became clear. Now the 
government is urging more product development and private sector R&D. Moreover, 
the government has asked semiconductor IC companies to concentrate in different 
market segments so as to avoid price competition and increase product differentiation. 
High-end market segments like telecommunication and engineering workstations are 
their focuses. 
The Korean now have a new eight-year plan, dubbed the G-7 Project The plan 
(as already noted) has just started in April, and is aimed at putting Korea's technology 
level on par with the Group of Seven developed countries by the year 2000.2 Based on 
this trend, Korea will be out of the low-end semiconductor IC competition soon. 
Taiwan 
As a latecomer to the international IC competition, Taiwan has done remarkably 
well. Government initiatives, readily available capital and the innate entrepreneurial 
spirit of the Chinese people, have created a new industry of almost unparalleled 
growth.3 Like Japan and Korea, centralized R&D is performed by the government 
organization ERSO (Electronic Service and Research Organization), one of about a 
^ a r k Clifford, "Taking on The Titans”, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 31,1991’ 
p.66. 
2 R U S S Arensman, Geoff Crane, Cbris Brown, and Drew Wilson, "Asia Turns On to R&D”， 
Electronic Business Asia (Hong Kong), Vol.2 No.12, December 5,1991, pp.42-52. 
3"Unlocking Taiwan's Potential as a World-class IC Manufacturer", Asian Electronics 
Engineer (Hong Kong), Vol.4 No.12, April 1991, pp.56-57. 
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dozen divisions under URI (Industrial Technology Research Institute).1 But, the 
semiconductor industry in Taiwan is structurally different from those of Japan and 
Korea. Most of the IC companies in Taiwan's Hsinchu science park are small to 
medium size. They were primarily set up by returning Taiwanese Americans who have 
worked in the U.S.A. semiconductor industries2. Like the U.S. counterparts, they are 
not vertically integrated. There are no complete electronics products manufacturing. ICs 
are their sole product line. 
Because of this kind of structure, the industry is at the mercy of their 
customers, the OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) and the end product 
manufacturers. Although Taiwanese semiconductor IC manufacturers have a local 
market five times their production,3 there is a severe mismatch between what they 
produce and what the customer needs. This is a reflection of the lack of marketing 
efforts. Another negative factor for the industry is the escalating cost. As a result, 
Taiwan's IC companies, in order to maximize revenue, are cutting low-end products 
and concentrating on higher revenue products.4 
Hong Kong 
RCL has two local competitors in Hong Kong. They are namely Hua Ko 
Electronics Inc. and Vitelic OHK) Ltd. 
Hua Ko Electronics Inc. 
Hua Ko, RCL and El Cap were the three founding semiconductor 
manufacturers. Back in 1979, they were the three brave enough to set up factories at 
Taipo Industrial Estate. El Cap later was acquired by Vitelic Corporation - a U.S. 
based semiconductor company. It is not a secret anymore that all three semiconductor 
start-ups were financially sponsored by the government of the People's Republic of 
China. With El Cap gone to a U.S. company, the Chinese have tightened their control 
Bernard C. Cole, "Inside: Taiwan: a Special Report", Electronic World Nern (Hong Kong), 
June 17,1991, pp.3G-53. 
2"Returning Engineers Boost Taiwan's High-end Production", Asian Electronics Engineer 
(Hong Kong), Vol.4 No.12, April 1991’ pp.150-151. 
3Rick Boyd-Merritt, "Taiwan has a Surplus of Entrepreneurs", Electronic World News (Hong 
Kong), June 17,1991, p.32. 
4Alan Patterson, "After Tough '90, UMC Focuses on Core Business", Electronic World 
News, June 17,1991，p.33. 
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on the remaining two companies. Hua Ko is controlled by the influential China 
Resources group. Now, the majority of the personnel at Hua Ko are mainland Chinese. 
As far as strategy goes, the company is aiming at cost leadership to maintain its 
low-end position. Hua Ko is the price leader in melody chips and simple-feature digital 
watch chips. Accordingly, they are the dominant volume supplier and have the majority 
market share in these segments. The management of Hua Ko is very satisfied at the 
present strategy. Their longer term goal is to build up enough earnings to upgrade their 
facilities all at one-shot instead of doing it piecemeal. By then, three to five years later 
according to the the management, Hua Ko will manufacture some higher-end products, 
Vitelic (HK) Ltd. 
Vitelic Corporation (a California Corporation) is a U.S. semiconductor design 
house specialized in computer memory products. It was set up by Taiwanese 
Americans and financed in a major part by Taiwanese capital. In 1987, after searching 
for a wafer fabrication plant in Asia for a while, Vitelic Corporation was finally 
connected with El Cap in Hong Kong. The same year, Vitelic Corporation agreed to 
purchase El Cap for 10 million U.S, dollars and changed the name to Vitelic (HK) Ltd. 
. After the purchase, problems within Vitelic (HK) Ltd. started to surface. First, 
they found out that the Hong Kong government was not nearly as enthusiastic about the 
semiconductor industry as its counterpart in Taiwan. Second, there was a shortage of 
qualified engineers to work in this field due to the lack of attention of the Hong Kong 
tertiary education institutions. Third, Vitelic (HK)'s own financial problems had 
crippled its plan to drastically upgrade the El Cap facilities. The latest news is that 
Vitelic (HK) has given up the idea of using the facility for production. Instead, it will 
be turned into a engineering verification and testing plant. 
RCL's Potential Competitors 
RCL's potential competitors are China, Singapore and the ASEAN countries. 
China (The People's Republic of China) 
To be independent in semiconductor technology is the paramount goal for 
China's Eighth Five-year plan. Ever since Deng Xiaoping's "Open-Door" policy was 
instigated in the late 1970s, the West had continually relaxed the semiconductor 
technology embargo imposed on China through COCOM. Despite the glitch in Sino-
U.S. relationship after the June 4th Massacre, the trend of relaxation of the COCOM 
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restrictions did not stop. It seems as if the West is committed to provide China with the 
needed technology as long as China keeps its <4Economic reforms" going. 
In the foreseeable future, limited by their technology, capital and market, the 
Chinese semiconductor manufacturing plants initially will most likely produce low-end 
IC products. They then will be RCL's potential competitors. However, as the Chinese 
are still constructing their plants1, the real threats will be at least two to three years 
away. Also, by then, there could well be a cooperative relationship between RCL and 
the Chinese semiconductor industry instead of a competitive one. 
Singapore 
Singapore until recently concentrated its efforts on positioning itself as the high 
quality value-added electronic product assembly center in the Far East. Lately, the 
government, pressed by decreasing margins in this assembly type of manufacturing is 
aiming at a boosting its semiconductor IC industry.2 Despite its determination, 
Singapore is however faced with a severe shortage of qualified engineers.3 This 
manpower problem stems from the long term neglect of a semiconductor curriculum in 
its education infrastructure. In the meantime, Singapore is trying to sustain its effort in 
setting up its IC industry by scouting for talent overseas. Nonetheless, this is only 
viable as a short term solution until Singapore gives its educational infrastructure the 
needed modifications. 
ASEAN countries 
Malaysia is the most ambitious among the ASEAN countries. However, its 
ability to get into the semiconductor IC industry is hampered by its lack of local skills. 
The other up and coming ASEAN countries are Thailand and Indonesia4. Based on 
their present situations, they are not expected to have their own semiconductor IC 
industry for another five years. 
!Rick Boyd-Merritt, "China Makes Trek Back: Two Years After Tiananmen Square, Business 
is Picking Up", Electronic World News (Hong Kong), June 3,1991, p.l, p.4. 
2Rick Boyd-Merritt, David Lammers and Bettyann Tirmelly, "Singapore Takes Aim at ICs", 
Electronic World News (Hong Kong), April 22,1991，p.l, p.33. 
3Giace Chang, "Chartered Semiconductor: Singapore Chip Firm is Making Its Move: The 
Government-financed Venture Aims to Create a Domestic Chip Industry from Its Base in ASICs", 
Electronic business Asia (Hong Kong), Vol.2 No.2, February, 1991, pp.36-37. 
4Joel McCormick, "Indonesia Refocuses its Electronics Strategy", Electronic Business Asia 
(Hong Kong), Vol.3 No.3, March 1992, p.100. 
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CHARFIERV 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
Summary 
It is helpful to look first at the most important external factor, and that is the 
attractiveness of the semiconductor IC industry. After this overall assessment, we will 
have a better perspective of RCL's competitive advantages and opportunities on the one 
hand and, its constraints and threats on the other hand. 
Industry Attractiveness 
From an application and usage point of view, the demand for semiconductor 
ICs, as far as we can see now, has no way to go but up. Some of the present 
investments in product designs like HDTV, high performance workstations, and the 
expansion of telecommunication markets in underdeveloped countries as well as the 
newly opened Eastern European countries could produce good growth for the 
industry.1 In more immediate terms, digital applications2 and wireless communications 
are likely to be the winners. 
In the more specific area where RCL is — low-end semiconductor IC 
manufacturing -- the picture is even rosier. The demand for these products remains 
strong and will stay that way as far as the experts can foresee. At the same time, the 
competitors are leaving this market because of the razor thin margins and their ever 
escalating cost. On the other end, because of the prohibitively large initial capital 
investment acting as a high entry barrier, it is unlikely to see new entrants coming into 
the market. Taking all these factors into consideration, the low-end semiconductor IC 
market is in effect a very attractive niche. 
1 "Finally, a Bit of Good News in 1991: Midyear Update", Electronic World News (Hong 
Kong), July 8,1991, p.l, p.33. 
2John Schwartz, <4The Next Revolution", Newsweek, April 6,1992, Newsweek, Inc., New 
Yoik, 1992, pp.52-58. 
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RCL's Competitive Advantages 
RCL does have major competitive advantages in two areas. The first 
competitive advantage ties in with its close relationship with China, and the second is 
its slight technological edge over its closest competitor, Hua Ko Electronics Inc. 
RCL，s “China Card’， 
As is obvious, one of the Hong Kong semiconductor industry's biggest 
problems is the lack of support from the government. 
However, if we look at this from a longer term perspective then we can see 
RCL won't have to stick with this government for long. 
Five years from now, in 1997，Hong Kong will revert to the sovereignty of 
China. 
At that time, the Chinese government will most probably have a great influence 
in the industrial policies of Hong Kong. There is a high possibility of a more 
interconnected China-Hong Kong semiconductor industry. The actual effect is 
anyone's guess but the consensus of experts is that the change would be for the better 
rather than for the worse.1 If that is the case, RCL being, already "in the Chinese 
camp", would definitely receive very favorable treatment. 
Also, because of its close relationship with China, another opportunity for RCL 
would be its priority to access the potentially huge China market. A market size 
approximately one-fifth of the world's population in one's back yard would be the 
dream of any marketer. Most importantly, since China is still relative backward, and the 
fact that it has an "Open-Doof policy ensuring the continuous improvement in Chinese 
living standards, the future demand for even basic low-end electronic products will be 
tremendous. 
RCL's technological edge over Hua Ko 
RCL's five inch wafer processing line is more advanced than Hua Ko's four 
inch line wafer processing line. Consequently, RCL can produce more advanced 
products like the analog display watch chip. At the present moment, RCL is the only 
^ w i s H. Young, “ A Touch of Chinese Austerity Doesn't Show", Electronic Business Asia, 
(Hong Kong), Vol.1 No.l, May 1990, p.14. 
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local analog watch chip supplier. In the future, RCL could utilizing its technological 




The most serious external factor that weakens RCL's position in the industry is 
the adverse investment environment. Compared with other countries, Hong Kong 
semiconductor industry is facing a relatively difficult investment environment. The 
major difference is the lack of active government support. Despite the current programs 
set up by the Hong Kong government to assist the high technology industry, many 
expert thinks the effort is either too little or too late.1 With the advent of the new airport 
project, more assistance from the government is unlikely in the future. 
Low-end competition 
RCL's immediate survival depends on how well it can compete with its 
competitors. At the present moment, they are the semiconductor IC manufacturers in 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, in addition to Hua Ko and Vitelic (HK) locally in Hong 
Kong. With their near future withdrawal from the low-end semiconductor IC market, 
semiconductor IC manufacturers from Japan, Korea and Taiwan will not be RCL's 
main concern. In the local arena, Vitelic (HK) has already stated its preferred strategy 
as being a testing and verification center rather than a production house. This leaves 
Hua Ko as RCL's major competitor. Hua Ko has a similar product portfolio as RCL's 
and because of its low operating cost, Hua Ko can undercut RCL's price consistently. 
Furthermore, Hua Ko has indicated that it will not deviate from this low-end, low-cost 
strategy for the foreseeable future. 
Internal factors 
RCL has a lot of internal constraints. They are in almost all of its functional 
areas. Table 5 on the next page is a summary of all these constraints: 
iRobin Agarwal, "A Case of Too Little, Too Late: Government Breaks Hands-off Policy to 
Fund ASIC Design Center," Electronic Business Asia (Hong Kong), May 5,1990，p.21. 
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Functional Areas Constraints 
Finance * Heavily in debt: latest figure is more than 20 
million Hong Kong dollars 
* Majority shareholder (MMEI) refuses to inject 
new investment capital into RCL 
* RCL is extremely short of working capital. 
ITiere are constant problems in meeting its 
payroll liabilities 
* No financial means to resolve its production 
bottleneck because of equipment shortage 
Management * Still have R&D - Cost center mentality 
* Weak in sales and marketing 
* Weak in operations control 
Operations * Lack operation procedures 
* Lack control mechanisms 
Products/Services * Lack outgoing testing 
* Lack quafcty assurance 
Table 5: RCL's constraints in the functional areas 
Implications 
« 
With the analyses of the industry attractiveness, and RCL's competitive 
advantages and constraints, we can proceed to look at the possible short term and long 
term strategies for RCL. 
Short Term Strategies for RCL 
Short term overall strategy 
Based on RCL's business constraints and competitive advantages, in the short 
term, a "Loss minimizing" or retrenchment strategy is best suited. If we refer to 
Kenichi Ohmae's business portfolio matrix (see Appendix IV), we can see that RCL is 
probably best sited in square "G". The market may be attractive in a general sense, but 
because of its own weak corporate position, the market looks unattractive for RCL at 
the moment. 
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Short term competitive strategy: externally focused 
The appropriate choice of RCL's short term competitive strategies is illustrated 
by Michael E. Porter's generic strategies framework (see Appendix V). 
Based on RCL's competitive advantages and constraints as were discussed in 
the previous chapter, RCL's "Strategic Advantage，，should be in the area of, 
"Uniqueness Perceived by the Customer" and not in the area of, "Low Cost Position". 
Not having a cost advantage in the low-end market, RCL should exploit its slight 
technological edge over its closest competitor, Hua Ko. Thus RCL should manufacture 
products that are perceived to have unique and advanced features (see table 3 on page 
31). By emphasizing product differentiation RCL would be able to minimize direct 
price competition with its competition. 
In terms of "Strategic Target", RCL should focus on a "Particular Segment 
Only" rather than have an "Industry Wide" approach. Having a focal market segment is 
of vital importance for RCL as it is now very short in resources. This niche marketing 
approach in the short term can best guarantee a means to return to profitability. 
Therefore, the best short term strategy for RCL should be product 
differentiation with focus on particular segment only as indicated by square "C" in 
Porter's generic strategies' matrix (see Appendix V). 
Short term tactics: internally focused on company's organization 
If RCL elects to retrench (loss-minimizing) with emphases on differentiation 
and focus, then the tactics to effect the aforementioned strategy could be implemented 
by making corresponding changes in its company functional structure. Table 6 on the 
next page lists the possible functional strategies for RCL. 
Long Term Strategy for RCL 
Long term overall strategy 
. v ; the long term, RCL should definitely opt for a growth strategy. RGL could 
fully utilize its close relationship with China to participate in a possible Hong Kong-
China semiconductor industry alliance. The basic idea is for RCL to build up its 
corporate strengths between now and 1997. Hopefully when 1997 arrives, RCL will 
be, depending on "Market Attractiveness", healthy enough to seek strategic growth in 
its business (refer to Kenichi Ohmae's business portfolio matrix in Appendix IV). 
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Functional Areas Strategy 
Finance * Induce stringent cost control to minimize loss 
* Downsizing: maintaining minimum personnel 
overhead 
hire mainland Chinese to fill 
suitable positions 
* Strive to break-even as soon as possible and 
then requests for more capital investment from 
MMEI 
Management * Enlarge marketing department 
* Increase sales and marketing activities 
Operations * Set up detailed operation procedures 
* Identify present production bottlenecks 
Products/Services * Set up a product planning division 
* Set up outgoing testing 
* Set up a quality assurance department 
Table 6: RCL's possible short term functional strategies 
* Long term competitive strategy 
Since in the near future, China could take the cost-leadership position in low-
end semiconductor ICs, it is wise for RCL to adhere to the differentiation and cost 
competitive strategy. The possibilities are that RCL could either pass some of the 
lower-end volume production to the Chinese production lines and concentrate on the 
high-end and higher margin parts or even gradually phase out its wafer production 
activities and, concentrate on product development and marketing activities for the 
Chinese semiconductor IC production lines. This is a proven winning strategy as can 
be illustrated by the Hong Kong garment and toy industries. 
Conclusions 
While reputedly having the most successM free market economy in the world, 
Hong Kong is a very difficult place for semiconductor IC manufacturers. 
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The Semiconductor IC industry needs active government participation and 
coordination because it is highly capital and talent intensive1. 
Unlike the other Little Dragons, Hong Kong has a positive non-intervention 
policy (v.s.). 
RCL, Hua Ko and Vitelic, the three (and only three) semiconductor IC 
manufacturers in Hong Kong are all struggling for their existence because of the lack of 
private investment capital and a supportive public policy. 
Ironically, Hong Kong has a thriving, export oriented electronics industry 
which import millions of dollars worth of semiconductor ICs each year. Logically, 
local semiconductor IC manufacturers should have a healthy market and plenty of 
customers. 
Therefore, from a supply vs. demand angle, RCL's problems concentrate more 
on the supply side rather than the demand side. There are both internal and external 
constraints limiting RCL's capability and capacity. 
Internally, RCL suffers a shortage of badly needed capital investment and the 
lack of a marketing oriented functional organization. 
Externally, RCL has to face competition in the low-end chip market and an 
unsupportive government policy. 
The good news is, on the competitive end, quite a few of RCL's competitors 
are leaving the low-end chip market and there are no new entrants in sight because of 
the thin margin and ever escalating cost Hence, the outlook of the industry is attractive. 
Moreover, RCL alone has two major competitive advantages. First, its close 
relationship with China entitles RCL to preferential access to the huge China market, 
and more importantly, RCL would benefit from the definitely more "participative" 
government when Hong Kong reverts to the sovereignty of China five years from now 
in 1997. Second, RCL's slight technological edge enables it to produce technically 
more advanced products and to protect itself from its closet competitor Hua Ko. 
iDrew Wilson, "It's Do or Die for a Struggling Chip Industry: Low-end Competition and 
Lack of Capital May Force Semiconductor Makers to Adopt New Strategies." Electronic Business Asia 
(Hong Kong), Vol.2 No.7, July 2,1991, ppJO-71. 
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After careful considerations, I have crafted both short term and long term 
strategies for RCL. 
In my opinion, the best short term strategy for RCL is "Loss minimizing", 
reorganize with a "marketing orientation", and emphases on product differentiation and 
focus. 
In the long term, RCL should pursue growth through a possible Hong Kong-
China semiconductor industry alliance. The close relationship with China could prove 
to be RCL's most valuable asset. 
Finally, as the only sure thing in the business environment is CHANGE, it 
must be understood that the validity of any recommendations for short and long term 
strategies is a function of time, Successful business organizations should always 
conduct periodic strategy reviews. Fundamental frameworks such as the ones 
established by Kenichi Ohmae (see Appendix IV) and Michael Porter (see Appendices 
V and VI) could be used as bases for continual strategy evaluation and re-evaluation. 
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Appendix I: Survey Questionnaires for RCL's Management 
Suryey on Opinions / ^ ) / ^ ^ / 7 I Confidential |j 
towards RCLfs future "^wmmmmmrnm 
Dear professionals, 
As a highly regarded member of the RCL management team, you are kindly requested 
to participate in this survey and the result of which will be used in comtemplating future 
RCL business strategies. Since your opinions carry obvious importance, well thought 
out responses and a serious attitude are required. 
Because of the possible sensitive contents of the survey, a neutral third party is 
contracted to conduct the survey. All the responses will be filtered and analyzed by the 
researcher and the results will be published in the form of summary statistics only. 
Hence, confidentiality is preserved. 
PI©as© tett yornr wi<e© b@ 職teiurdU 
1 
If your have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact Francis Ko. 






. Appendix I: Sui-vey Questionnaires for RCL's Management 
Survey on Opinions /^^ /7 Confidential |j 
towards RCL's future I j r d ^ l J L ！ 
� Official Use 
(1) Nature of Job at RCL (check the most appropriate one) . _ . _ , ~ . ~ , 




__ Personnel & Aministration 
—Sales/Marketing 
__ Board of Directors 
—Other (please specify) 
(2) Years at RCL 
: ！ 
(3a) How would you describe you know most about RCL? 
i 
(3b) How would you describe you know least about RCL? 
(4) Your understanding of why the company was founded: 
Page 1/6 Sept., 1991 
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. Appendix I: Sui-vey Questionnaires for RCL's Management 
Survey on Opinions rj Confidential b 
towards RCL's future "Tammmmmmmm 
(5) Your understanding of how the company was founded: 
(6) Compare to other companies in this industry, how do you find RCVs performance: 
_ best 
—better than most 
—about the same 
— n o t as good as most 
(7a) RCL's strengths as a company: 
(7b) RCL's weaknesses as a company: 
. 
Page 1/6 Sept., 1991 
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. Appendix I: Sui-vey Questionnaires for RCL's Management 
Survey on Opinions 1 Confidential b 
towards RCL's future ^mmmmm^m^ 
(8) What are the kind of products RCL is making? 
(9a) RCL's products strengths compared with other companies': 
(9b) RCL's products weaknesses compared with other companies': 
Page 1/6 Sept., 1991 
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. Appendix I: Sui-vey Questionnaires for RCL's Management 
Survey on Opinions l ln^/r^ni Confidential hi 
towards RCL's future I j l i ^ ^ l L k ^mrnm^mtmBm 
(10) What do you think are the company's primary markets (for different products)? 
(11) How do you discribe the market environment (for different products)? 
(12) What are the market trends (for different products)? 
(13) What do you think the market size is - TAM (for different products)? 
(14) What do you think RCL's market share is _ SOM in these markets 
(for different products)? 
(15) What do you think RCL's growth potential is in these markets (for different products)? : • ; 
Page 1/6 Sept., 1991 
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. Appendix I: Sui-vey Questionnaires for RCL's Management 
Survey on Opinions rj 丨 Confidential b 
towards RCL's future I n i v ^ ^amammmmmam 
(16) Who do you think are the customers/potential customers (for different products)? 
major/minor • 
split 
(17) What do you think are the customers' attitudes (for different products)? 
like/don't like 
uasage? 
(18) What do you think are the customers' consumption patterns (for different products)? 
price 
vs. value added 
commodities 
vs. solution 
(19) How do you think the customers make decisions (for different products)? 
Page 1/6 Sept., 1991 
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Appendix I: Survey Questionnaires for RCL's Management 
Survey on Opinions / 7 ^ / ^ / 7 Confidential h 
towards RCL's future "^mmammmmm 
(20) What do you think is the competitive environment (for different products)? 
major/minor -
I ^ I Z I I I I I I Z I Z I I I I I i m i m ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ sPlit 
(21) What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of competitors 
(for different products)? 
(22) What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of competitors (organization)? 
(23) What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of competitors 
(marketing capabilities)? 
A n v t h i n c r e l s e ? 
Page 6/6 Sept. ,1991 
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Appendix I: Survey Questionnaires for RCL's Management 
. * 
^ , 2 j i z z 
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Appendix n： Survey Questionnaires for 
RCL's Customers 
- - � 
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Appendix II: Survey Questionnaires for RCL's Customers 
Survey on Opinions I Confidential ji 
towards RCL's future I n i L ^ I ^ T " " " " " " " " 
Dear professionals, 
As a customer of RCL, you are kindly requested to participate in this survey and the 
result of which will be used in a report concerning the future of RCL and the industry. ^ 
Since your opinions carry obvious importance, well thought out responses and a serious 
attitude are required. 
Because of the possible sensitive contents of the survey, all the responses will be 
filtered and analyzed by the researcher and results will be published in the form of 
summary statistics only. Hence, confidentiality is preserved. 
Pleas© coiisiMlbmit© y o w opmioBs! 
If your have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact me at anytime. 
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Appendix II: Survey Questionnaires for RCL's Customers 
Survey on Opinions rj Confidential h 
towards RCLfs future • "-^mmmmmmrn | 
… . .* � Official Use 
(1) Area of responsibilty (check the most appropriate one) . _ , _ . — — . _ . 




___ Personnel & Aministration 
—Sales/Marketing 
_ Board of Directors 
一 Other (please specify) 
(2) Years in business 
(3a) How would you describe you know most about RCL? 
(3b) How would you describe you know least about RCL? 





Page 1/5 Dec” 1991 I 
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Appendix II: Survey Questionnaires for RCL's Customers 
Survey on Opinions r S ^ / r ^ l l Confidential |i 
towards RCL's future I f i l iC^IL^ • • “ j 
(5) Your understanding of how the RCL was founded: 
(6) Compare to other companies Jn this Industry, you find RCL's performance: 
_ best 
—better than most 
—about the same 
___ not as good as most 
(7a) RCL's strengths as a company: 







Page 2/5 Dec.，1991 I 
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Appendix II: Survey Questionnaires for RCL's Customers 
Survey on Opinions ^^ rj Confidential |i 
towards RCL's future I f u i ^ l J ^ 
(8) Your understanding the kinds of products RCL is making. 
(9) Which RCL products are you most interested in? Least interested in7 
= 
(10) Are you buying from or planning to buy from RCL? When? Why? 
_ 
(9b) What do you like the least about RCL's products: 
- ~ ~ . : ： 
； 
. . . j . j 
,'j. •；, J 
Page 3/5 Dec., 1991 
i 
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Appendix II: Survey Questionnaires for RCL's Customers 
Survey on Opinions / 7 ^ 1 / ^ / 7 Confidential b 
towards RCLfs future "-mam^mmm^ | 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 1 
(10) What is your company's primary markets (for different products)? 
(11) How do you discribe the market environment (for different products)? 
(12) What are the market trends (for different products)? 
(13) What do you think the market size is • TAM (for different products)? 
(14) What do you think your company's market share is - SOM in these markets 
(for different products)? 
(15) What do you think your company's growth potential is in these markets � j 
(for different products)? 
I 
. J 
Page 4/5 Dec” 1991 P^ n^fi 1 
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Appendix II: Survey Questionnaires for RCL's Customers 
Survey on Opinions f j ^ / ^ k f l Confidential |j 
towardsRCLfsfuture nmmmmmmtmrn j 
(20) What do you think is the competitive environment for RCL (for different products)? 
major/minor -
split 
(21) What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of RCL's competitors 
(products/services)? 
(22) What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of RCL's competitors 
(company/organizations)? 
• 
(23) What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of RCL's competitors 
(marketing capabilities)? 
-- . “V?; 
'. , • I 
Anything else? I 
,，、‘. ： ' r . . , . 厂 . . ， “ . I 
Page 5/5 Dec” 1991 ! 
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Appendix II: Survey Questionnaires for RCL's Customers 
I J S > Z ^ J 
X ： 、 
p m ® M L S w w j ^ 
l 泰 — 豫 中 文 大 學 趣 賓 作 耿 t - 1 
1 番 港 中 于 工 j 
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Appendix III: Survey Questionnaires for Semiconductor Industry Experts 
Survey on Opinions ^ ^ nj Confidential In 
towards RCL's future [ j l j i ^ l J ^ "i^i""""""""* 丨 
Dear professionals, 
As a highly regarded member of the semiconductor IC industry, you are kindly 
requested to participate in this survey and the result of which will be used in a report 
concerning the future of RCL and the industry. Since your opinions carry obvious 
importance, well thought out responses and a serious attitude are required. 
Because of the possible sensitive contents of the survey, all the responses will be 
filtered and analyzed by the researcher and results will be published in the form of 
• summary statistics only. Hence, confidenliality is preserved. 
Yomir ©spertt opmiosi i s apjpreciattedJ 
If your have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact me at anytime. 
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Appendix HI: Survey Questionnaires for Semiconductor Industry Experts 
Survey on Opinions H ^ / ^ l / l 1 Confidential |j 
towards RCL's future Ijrd^^LLk 
… � … � Official Use 
(1) Functional responsibllty (check the most appropriate one) . _ . _ . — — , ~ . 




一 Personnel & Aministration 
__ Sales/Marketing 
—Board of Directors 
—Other (please specify) • 
(2) Years at in the industry 
(3a) How would you describe you know most about RCL? 
(3b) How would you describe you know least about RCL? 
(4) How would you describe the line of business of your company? 
. . • - ‘ 
Page 1/6 Nov., 1991 
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Appendix EI: Survey Questionnaires for Semiconductor Industry Experts 
Survey on Opinions / 7 ^ / ^ ^ / 7 Confidential |j 
towards RCL/s future [ ^ ( ^ [ L ^ ； 
(5) Your understanding of how the company was founded: 
(6) Compare to other companies in this Industry, how do you find RCL's performance: 
— b e s t 
一 better than most 
一 about the same 
— n o t as good as most 
(7a) RCL's strengths as a company: 
(7b) RCL's weaknesses as a company: 
�� 
• • Jy^. 
Page 2/6 Nov” 1991 
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Appendix EI: Survey Questionnaires for Semiconductor Industry Experts 
Survey on Opinions f j 丨 Confidential 
towards RCL's future I r d ^ ^ l L j i ^ " “ ™ " " - 1 
(8) Your understanding the kind of products RCL is making. 
(9a) RCL's products strengths compared with other companies': 
(9b) RCL's products weaknesses compared with other companies': 
“ ‘ 一 
Page 3/6 Nov. ,1991 
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Appendix EI: Survey Questionnaires for Semiconductor Industry Experts 
Suryey on Opinions / 7 ^ / ^ ^ / 7 1 Confidential j| 
towards RCLfs future ^ w a a ^ a ^ ^ m 
愿 嫌 纖 务 ^ ^ ^ ^ 叙 ^ ^ ^ 爾 纖 纖 ― 慶 赢 編 減 狐 狐 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ™ ^ ^ 
I (10) Your understanding of the company's primary markets (for different products)? 
_ 
I (13) What do you think the market size is - TAM (for different products)? 
^ ^ ^ 丨 
| (14) What do you think RCL's market share is - SOM in these markets 
(for different products)? 
I ‘•拟 
I (15) What do you think RCL's growth potential is in these markets (for different products)? 
I 一 __I 
Page 2/6 Nov” 1991 
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Appendix III: Survey Questionnaires for Semiconductor Industry Experts 
Survey on Opinions l ^ ^ / r ^ l l Confidential |j 
towards RCLfs future / / I J ^ i i ^ ^ T ^ m m m m m ^ 
(16) Who do you think are RCL's customers/potential customers (for different products)? 
— major/minor -
ziziiziiiiiziiiziiiiiiiiizmmmmi^^^ 印衍 
(17) what do you think are these customers' attitudes (for different products)? 
like/don't like 
uasage? 
(18) What do you think are these customers' consumption patterns (for different products)? 
price 
• vs. value added 
commodities 
vs. solution . 
(19) How do you think these customers make decisions (for different products)? 
Page 5/6 Nov., 1991 
J — — — » — — — • ^ — — j M — q a — — — — — 
.80 ；.;；: . � v . � . � . N 
71 
Appendix EI: Survey Questionnaires for Semiconductor Industry Experts 
Survey on Opinions f j 丨 Confidential h 
towards RCLs future / p J ^ / L ^ "nmm^mmmrn 
(20) What do you think is RCL's competitive environment (for different products)? 
major/minor -
split 
(21) What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of RCL's competitors 
(for different products)? 
(22) What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of RCL's competitors 
(organization)? 
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Appendix III: Survey Questionnaires for Semiconductor Industry Experts 
J J 8 , Z 




Appendix IV: Kenichi Ohmae's Business Portfolio Matrix 
Source: Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist, Penguin Books, 1982, p.141. 
A. Sftrimis entry tnfn the B. ,Se1gCtive growth C. AH-OUt Struggle 
market 
Opportunistic position to Select areas where Concentrate entire effort 
High t e s t growth prospects; strength can be on maintaining strength; If 
withdraw if indications of maintained, and necessary maintain profit 
sustainable growth are concentrate investment in structure by investment. 
lacking. those areas. 
CA … … ‘ … ‘ - • “ 丨 ： 」 ； 
W ：: . V. ： a 
§ P. Limited expansion or E. Selective expansion F. Maintenance of 
•芸 withdrawal supedQiitY 
N • Look for ways of achieving Concentrate investment, Build up ability to counter 
匀 Medium expansion without high and expand only in competition, avoiding 
risk; If unsuccessful, segments where large-scale investment; 
cS withdraw before involved profitability is good and emphasize profitability by 
•g too deeply. risk is relatively low. raising productivity. 
A 
S — 
a. Tms-minimizmg H. Overall harvesting I. T ,imitc4 ftarvestipg 
Prevent losses before they Promote switch from fixed Reduce degree of risk to a 
occur by avoiding to variable costs; minimum in several 
L o w investment and by lowering emphasize profitability segments; emphasize 
fixed costs; when loss is through VA and VE of profit by protecting 
unavoidable, withdraw. variable costs. profitability even if loss of 
market position is 
involved. 
Low Medium High 
Corporate Strengths 
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Appendix V: Generic Strategies 




by the Customer Low Cost Position 
—Industry-wide Differentiation Overall 
gj Cost Leadership 
C3 
H 
• a A B a i .… • ; . • ' . • … " • •： 
2 Focus: C D Focus: 
S Particular differentiate cost leadership 
0 ‘ t within within 
Segment Only s e g r m n t segment 
Appendix VI: Elements of Industry Structure 
Source: Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage (New York: Free Press, 1985)，p.6. 
New Entrants 
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Suppliers I . • _ 钃 of Buyers 
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Power of Suppliers Intensity 
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